The 9 propositions of Scientific Idealism

Copyright 2016 Graham Berrisford.

One of about 300 papers at http://avancier.website. Last updated 26/03/2017 23:17

 

The headings below are the 9 propositions of scientific idealisation.

Contents

Preface (repeated in other papers) 1

1 Describers create and use descriptions of realities that they observe and envisage. 1

2 Descriptions are created and used by describers to idealise realities. 1

3 Realities may be observed and envisaged by describers and embody descriptions. 1

4 Describers are also realities. 2

5 Descriptions are also realities. 2

6 Ideas are encoded in descriptions. 2

7 Mental and verbal models are intertwined descriptions. 2

8 The qualities of realities exist only in descriptions. 2

9 Descriptions are types. 3

Footnote: Descriptions created by accident of cause and effect 3

 

Preface (repeated in other papers)

A system can be characterised as parts that interact in regular, repeated or repeatable behaviors.

It can exist in two forms - a concrete system realises (or instantiates) an abstraction system description (or type).

 

The Solar System

A Beethoven symphony

Abstract system description

The “Solar System” as described by an astronomer

A musical score as written by Beethoven

Concrete system realisation

Several large physical bodies orbiting the sun

Performances that instantiate the symphony in physical sound waves

 

Which begs a more general question: how are describers, descriptions and realities related?

Realist philosophers say realities have descriptions, which describers can discover.

Idealist philosophers say describers create descriptions to help them deal with realities.

Our scientific idealism separates describers, descriptions and described realities.

Scientific Idealism Triangle

Descriptions

<create and use>               <idealise>

Describers    <observe and envisage>     Realities

 

Most realities are more complex and multi-faceted than any description of them.

And a particular reality may not exactly fit a description applied to it.

Outside of mathematics and computing, fuzzy matching of realities to descriptions is normal.

1 Describers create and use descriptions of realities that they observe and envisage

A describer is an entity able to observe and envisage realities - past, present or future.

And able to create, recall and use descriptions of realities.

These abilities are part of the describer’s intelligence.

Scientific idealism

Descriptions

<create and use>              <idealise>

Describers   <observe and envisage>   Realities

2 Descriptions are created and used by describers to idealise realities

A town map is distinct from the town it represents.

Selected properties of the town are encoded in symbols on the map.

Descriptions are distinct from the realities they describe.

A description is anything that encodes ideas or properties abstracted from realities.

Descriptions include mental, documented and other kinds of model.

Scientific idealism

Descriptions

<create and use>              <idealise>

Describers   <observe and envisage>   Realities

 

Descriptions are abstractions, they can be fuzzy and contradictory in places.

However, realities can be tested for conformance to a description.

And if those tests are passed, then the description is good enough

 

Descriptions may be encoded a communicable form (such as speech or writing) and shared.

Here, are main interest is abstract system descriptions encoded in written words.

3 Realities may be observed and envisaged by describers and embody descriptions

Anything and everything that a describer can describe is a reality.

Realities include entities, such as a wolf, a pack of wolves, a rose bush, a field, a planet, a solar system, a telephone company, and a molecule.

Also events and processes, such as tennis matches and symphony performances.

Scientific idealism

Descriptions

<create and use>              <idealise>

Describers   <observe and envisage>   Realities

 

Describers cannot fully understand reality directly; they can only understand their descriptions of realities.

The describe realities in terms of discrete entities and events

Realities can be tested as manifesting those entity and events types.

4 Describers are also realities

A describer is a reality, and can be described by a describer.

(Self-describing entities are discussed in other papers.)

Scientific idealism

Descriptions

<create and use>                <idealise>

Describers   <observe and envisage>   Describers

5 Descriptions are also realities

A map of a town isn’t a real town, but it is a real thing in its own right.

Any description can be viewed as a reality, and described by a describer.

Scientific idealism

Descriptions

<create and use>                 <idealise>

Describers  <observe and envisage>  Descriptions

 

Recursive description of description is commonplace in the specification of complex systems.

Software systems are often described at three levels of abstraction, called: physical, logical and conceptual description.

Others kinds of abstraction are discussed in other papers.

6 Ideas are encoded in descriptions

A mental model is a description (be it simple or complex) encoded in a mind about a reality.

All intelligent animals create and use their mental models to help them deal with reality and predict future events.

Animal intelligence

Mental models

<form and recall>        <idealise biologically>

Animals            <observe and predict>         Realities

 

The trouble is that mental models are flexible, fuzzy, fragile and contradictory in places.

To improve our mental models, we talk to each other about them.

And to stabilise our mental models, we write them down.

Human intelligence

Documented models

<write and read>                 <idealise in text>

People              <observe and envisage>          Realities

 

Scientific idealism regards all descriptions (mental, documented and other) as encodings of ideas.

Human intelligence

Mental, documented and other models

<create and use>                   <idealise>

Describers       <observe and envisage >         Realities

7 Mental and verbal models are intertwined descriptions

We translate mental models into and out of verbal forms, both spoken and written.

We write – which involves translating mental models into documented models.

We read – which involves translating documented models into mental models.

Human intelligence

Mental & documented models

<create and use>                 <can be translated from>

Humans         <observe and envisage>   Mental & documented models

 

In other words, people decode ideas from mental models and encode them in documented models.

And do the reverse, they decode ideas from documented models and encode them in mental models.

8 The qualities of realities exist only in descriptions

Describers create and use universal quality types that generalise from particular things

Further, a universal must be encoded in at least one description, else it does not exist.

A quality cannot be measured until a particular thing until the quality type has been described.

Scientific idealism in general

Universals or Quality types

<create and use>             <idealise>

Describers <observe and envisage> Particulars

9 Descriptions are types

To typify things is to describe one thing – one member of a set of similar things.

Less obviously, the converse is true; to describe one thing is to typify it.

Once you have described one thing, there is no limited to the number of similar things that may be observed or envisaged.

 

This applies to the description of a single true/false value, of which there can be many instances.

It applies equally well to the very large and complex specification of a Boeing 747, of which there can be many instances.

A description cannot constrain the number of realities that might instantiate it.

As soon as you describe what you consider to be a unique thing, you can immediately envisage a second instance of that type.

E.g. scientists now talk of parallel universes.

Footnote: Descriptions created by accident of cause and effect

Proposition 2 says scientific idealism is about descriptions created by describers.

A reader has suggested that a crater on a moon idealises some features of the asteroid that caused it.

Yes, but the crater was caused by accident and the triangle below contains no describer.

Effects of causes

Craters

<hold>       <are effects caused by>

Moons            <are struck by>          Asteroids

 

It is possible to redraw the triangle so it gets half way towards meeting proposition 2.

This version says astronomers study craters and can envisage the asteroids that caused them.

Interpreting effects of cause

Craters

<study>                  <idealise>

Astronomers        <envisage>           Asteroids

 

But still, cases of this kind lie outside the mainstream of scientific idealism and its application in system theory.

 

 

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